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COST SHARING IN AIR-SERVICE PROVISION
DAVID TIMOTHY DuVtAL*
NVEN WINCHESTER**

I.

INTRODUCTION

T1HE PROVISION of air services to geographically remote areas can be critical for their economic growth. Small states
with comparatively smaller economies often suffer from a lack of
air-service provision as a consequence of their size.' Insufficient
domestic capital can restrain profitable operations by a national
carrier, and the states' small geographic and economic size may
result in less economic activity and, by extension, demand for
air-service access. 2 As a result, international access to small
states often falls to foreign airlines who understandably seek
positive returns from passenger traffic and cargo operations.
Paradoxically, such services are somewhat tenuous in that their
ability to generate positive yields can be limited as a result of
* Dr. David Timothy Duval is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Business and
Economics at the University of Winnipeg, Canada and Honorary Associate
Professor in the School of Business at the University of Otago, New Zealand. He
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of government air-access policy.
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serving thin markets and thin routes.' Small origin-market size
and significantly smaller (comparatively) demand for destination traffic can impede revenue, yield, and, ultimately,
EBITDAR 4 margins. Volatile economic conditions-notably periods of significant demand slump, such as the global economic
crisis of 2008 and 2009-can further hamper profitable performance in markets where foreign carriers operate to remote
destinations.
Not surprisingly, then, those states separated from key source
markets by large distances (both physical and network) may
have economically valid reasons for ensuring that air-transport
accessibility is maintained. This is especially the case when valuable foreign exchange earnings from visitors are at risk. A strategic policy question for these instances therefore becomes what
levers are available for remote destinations to attract and maintain sufficient air services for the benefit of trade in goods and
services?
The purpose of this article is to review the conditions that may
lead to an operational cost-share agreement between a state and
a foreign commercial airline. A related purpose is to review the
resulting implications for wider government-based policies relating to connectivity in instances where demand for access is low.
Attention is directed toward thin-market policy options for remote states. Thin markets are revealed when (a) demand for
travel to a destination is limited due to relative utility achieved
through substitutes, (b) supply-side variables such as geographic
size (e.g., small islands) and development barriers limit economies of scale, or both. We argue that cost-share agreements may
be efficient when existing market demand is insufficient for a
foreign airline to continue service without subsidization and
that the resulting arrangement may have critical implications for
future market development as well as general stated policies on
trade in goods and services.
The article begins with a brief review of the economic geography of connectivity and accessibility in the context of destination
prosperity and development potential. This is followed by a discussion of the elementary economics of air-service subsidies with
the focus on different approaches to subsidies that can be lev3 James Nolan, Pamela Ritchie, and John Rowcroft, Small Market Service and
Regional Policy, 39 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL'y 363, 364 (2005).
4 EBITDAR is Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, Amortization,
and Rent.
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ied. A case study of the Cook Islands in the South Pacific is then
presented as an example of the union of both issues, demonstrating that the policy dimensions of optimal choice ex ante for
autochthonous states is that which minimizes loss ex post. After
considering the implications for these types of cost-share arrangements on access policy and strategy, some future prospects
for such agreements are discussed in the conclusion.
II.

CONNECTIVITY AND ACCESSIBILITY: THE
ANTECEDENTS OF COST SHARING

A brief review of the importance of connectivity and accessibility demonstrates the value of cost-sharing arrangements. The
context within which air-service subsidization becomes a policy
option is not only embedded within a state's political and economic ties to wider streams of trade and commerce but also
within its relative measure of geographic accessibility and connectivity. We are here less interested in connectivity as a measurable tool for maximizing efficient capital allocation across a
network,' but more in the concept of connectivity as a mechanism that leads to conclusions regarding general economic development, both actual and potential. Doing so puts transport

access-particularly air access-firmly within the scope of government policy. Transport connectivity and accessibility are critical for economic balance and sustainability; the health of a
state's economy can be linked to the extent to which it is connected, and thus integrated, within a network.6 With respect to

tourism-development potential, access and connectivity can be
just as critical as marketing efforts or product development. 7
Geographic analyses of accessibility consider variables such as
the number of nodes and their spatial dispersion, although
under a gravity model, the size of particular nodes can also factor into the relative demand for access.8 Small or more remote
nodes, then, are at a relative geographical disadvantage. This
5 See Guillaume Burghouwt et al., Air Network Performance and Hub Competitive
Position:Evaluation of PrimaryAirports in East and South-East Asia, 3 AIRPORT MGMT.
384, 386 (2009).
6 See David Banister & Yossi Berechman, Transport Investment and the Promotion
of Economic Growth, 9 J. TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY 209, 209-10 (2001).
7 See Andreas Papatheodorou, Civil Aviation Regimes and Leisure Tourism in Europe, 8J. AIR TRANsP. MGMT. 381, 385-87 (2002).
s Darren M. Scott et al., Network Robustness Index: A New Method for Identifying
CriticalLinks and Evaluating the Performanceof TransportationNetworks, 14 J. TRASP.
GEOGRAPHY

215, 218-21 (2006).
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can have significant implications for the provision of commercial-transport services to those destinations. The economic viability of a network of nodes and their related interconnects can
be derived from the demand for interaction across multiple
node pairings. Thus, traditional9 geographic measures of networks include gamma calculations, e.g., y = e/e, , where e is the

number of links in a network.' Such models can assist network
planning by assessing demand through Newtonian-based gravity
considerations but may not necessarily account for market variances and features.'1
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) noted
that connectivity has a net positive impact on productivity and
can have important implications for policy-notably a conscious
attempt at liberalization or a continuance, depending on existing degrees of liberalization-the degree of competitiveness
in the market, and the extent to which aviation contributes to
economic growth. 12 A connectivity model developed by IATA
features Chicago O'Hare and London Heathrow as the most
connected because of their relative connectivity to other highly
connected destinations.13 Where this discussion becomes pertinent to the concept of cost sharing is the extent to which connectivity has an impact on remote destinations that are not
connected nearly as well. This can be explained in many ways,
although it is likely that weak demand as a consequence of
small-market access is perhaps most indicative.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF AIR-SERVICE SUBSIDIES
While the term "cost share" is used here more or less as a
concept derived from the public-policy literature, it is acknowledged that a more accurate commercial description follows typical economic definitions of a direct subsidy. For our purposes, a
subsidy is any financial instrument put in place by a government
or public body to directly benefit a domestic or foreign private
9 Studies from the 1950s and 1960s in the spatial geography literature sought
to utilize interaction and graph theory to understand flows. Such studies have
since given way to quantitatively advanced methods in geography, such as GIS
mapping, and advanced econometrics. Nonetheless, these still serve as a useful
basis for understanding the principles of traffic flows.
10Scott et al., supra note 8, at 219.
11 See I.G. Heggie, Are Gravity and InteractuanceModels a Valid Techniquefor Planning Regional Transport Facilities?, 20 OPERATIONAL RES. 93, 93-108 (1969).
12 Mark Smyth & Brian Pearce, 1A TA Economics Briefing No. 8: Aviation Economics
Benefits, IATA (2007).
13 Id.
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firm for the purpose of assisting production.' 4 Subsidies are
often implemented to protect infant industries or to secure domestic production of a good or service within unbalanced markets and, thus, can be designed to correct market failure, often
in lack-of-output form. 5 Criticisms of subsidies generally relate
to the resulting artificial distortion of markets. 6
The use of subsidies as a policy lever, especially surrounding
implementation and legal ramifications, were the subject of
global-trade negotiations leading up to the Geneva round of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations
in 1947.17 Since then, however, precise definitions have not
achieved substantive international agreement. As the Uruguay
Round of GATT did not clarify the subject definitively, the definition of a subsidy and the extent to which subsidies are used
and justified globally on various goods and services remains
variable.'"
A.

SUBSIDY VARIANTS IN AIR-SERVICE PROVISION

Subsidization in air-service provision can occur at varying
levels.1 9 First, and from a regulatory perspective, states may hold
majority shareholding in a provider either out of necessity, as a
result of a recapitalization effort, or as a means of ensuring that
iconic "flag" status is maintained. Further, a state may restrict
seventh or fifth freedom air rights in an effort to protect the
routes of a national carrier.2 ° Specific routes may be protected
through the awarding of monopoly rights to a specific carrier,
subject to any potential regulatory restrictions within existing air
service memoranda.2 ' Second, withholding criteria associated
with air-service arrangements, such as strict ownership and control regulations, can be classified as a form of indirect subsidization of air services in that they restrict potential foreign14

E.g., BRiAN McDONALD, THE WORLD TRAVELING SYSTEM: THE URUGUAY

ROUND AND BEYOND

15
16

103 (St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1998).

Id. at 100.
Id. at 98.

Shane Spradlin, The Aircraft Subsidies Dispute in the GATT's UruguayRound, 60
& COM. 1191, 1194 (1995).
18 Id. at 1201-05.
19 See Table 2 infra Part V.
17

J.

AIR L.

20 Freedoms of the Air, INT'L CIL AVIATION ORG., [ICAO] http://www.icao.
int/icao/en/trivia/freedoms-air.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2011).
21

Nolan, Ritchie & Rowcroft, supra note 3, at 368.
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designated entrants from starting new services. 22 Third, commercial joint ventures between airlines, airports, and destination
marketing organizations are becoming more common. One recent example is the partnership between American Airlines and
the Chicago Convention and Tourism Bureau.23
A fourth method of subsidization involves direct government
subsidy where the goal is to ensure an airline's costs are covered
either wholly or in part.24 In practice, subsidization of commercial air services to preserve accessibility and connectivity is not
uncommon. Several examples of direct subsidies for air-service
provision can be found, some of which can be traced back to
early periods of commercial air transport. 25 In the late 1950s,
the International Civil Aviation Organization commissioned a
study to investigate the economic implications of long-range jet
transport, the results of which noted that:
Governments may need to reexamine certain aspects of their
civil air transport policies in the light of the new situation to decide such questions as the extent to which airlines should be assisted by such means as direct subsidy, or relaxation of taxation
measures and policies for charging for the use of airports and air
navigation facilities. They may need to review the arrangements
by which commercial rights are at present granted, and also to
consider the desirability of increasing contributions to technical
assistance funds and of participating in

new joint financing

schemes.2 6
Subsidization can take the form of national public-service policies. Examples designed to ensure air services to remote desti22 Yu-Chun Chang & George Williams, Changingthe Rules-Amending the Nationality Clauses in Air Services Agreements, 7J. AR TRANsp. MGMT. 207, 208 (2001). A
simplified example is Brisbane-Auckland-Rarotonga (BNE-AKL-RAR) services
operated by Pacific Blue (AUS) Pty Ltd (although wet leasing aircraft from Pacific Blue Airlines (NZ)). Pacific Blue Airlines (NZ) is effectively controlled in
Australia, and thus the BNE-AKL sector is necessary because Australian and international services originating in New Zealand must be operated by airlines with
effective control and substantial ownership in New Zealand, given neither have
exchanged seventh freedom passenger rights. Similarly, third country carriers
operating across the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand do so currently under fifth-freedom routings with either country serving as the beyond or
intermediate point.
23 News Release, Chicago Convention & Tourism Bureau, CCTB/American
Airlines Expand Strategic Marketing Partnership (June 18, 2010).
24 Myron W. Watkins, The Aviation Industry, 39J. POL. ECON. 42, 52-53 (1931).
25 Id.
26 News Release, L.C. Boussard, Pub. Info. Officer, ICAO, The Economic Implications of Long-Range Jet Air Transportation (Aug. 4, 1958).
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nations can be found worldwide, including the United States'
Essential Air Services program, 27 Australia's Remote Air Services
Subsidy Scheme, 2 ' and the European Union's Public Service
Obligations program.2 9 In their comparative review, George
Williams and Romano Pagliari found widely varying policies on
the application of direct subsidies as public services for air services within Europe, querying whether a more equitable centralization of air service subsidization should be implemented at the
level of the European Union rather than through individual
member states. ° Of course, subsidies in air transport in general
extend well beyond air-service provision, with perhaps the most

publicized example being the alleged protectionist policies of
the European community and U.S. government over subsidization of Airbus and Boeing aircraft production.3
Subsidization can also function as a policy option for cities or
regions that would otherwise not be considered remote from ei-

ther a connectivity or accessibility perspective. Several recent
examples highlight what is likely a growing trend in direct subsidization of service by governments at varying levels.32 In the
United States, AirTran confirmed in June 2009 that its operations out of Wichita Mid-Continent Airport were profitable only
as a result of direct subsidies in the amount of $6.5 million from
the city, county, and state.3 Similarly, it was reported in July
49 U.S.C. §§ 41732-33 (2007).
Remote Air Services Subsidy Scheme, AUST. GoV'T DEP'T OF INFRASTRUCTURE &
TRANSP., http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/regional/rass.aspx (last updated Jan. 10, 2011).
29 Council Regulation 2408/92, art. 4(1)(a), 1992 OJ. (L 240) 3.
30 George Williams & Romano Pagliari, A ComparativeAnalysis of the Application
and Use of Public Service Obligations in Air Transport Within the EU, 11 TRANSP. POL'Y
55, 60-63 (2004).
31 Nils Meier-Kaienburg, The WTO's "Toughest" Case: An Examination of the Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Resolution Procedurein the Airbus-Boeing Dispute over Aircraft Subsidies, 71 J. AIR L. & CoM 191, 197-205 (2006).
32 BUREAU OF ECON., ENERGY, & Bus. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2009 INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT - AUSTRALIA (2009); Joel Millman & Mike Esterl, Air
Hubs Pay to Keep their Spokes, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2009 at A3; Andrew Heasley,
Tiger Claws into Leisure Market-With Government's Help, THE AGE, June 3, 2010,
http://www.theage.com.au/travel/travel-news/tiger-claws-into-leisure-marketwith-governments-help-20100603-x25x.html; Thomas Cook Warns Canaries "Unfair
Subsidies to Ryanair: We Could Cut Capacity to the Canary Islands'" BARCELONA REP.,
Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.barcelonareporter.com/index.php?/news/comments/thomas cookwarnscanariesunfair subsidiest-o-ryanairwecouldcut
_capacit/; AirTran Chief Calls Public Money Crucial, (KSN television broadcastJune
24, 2009).
33 AirTran Chief Calls Public Money Crucial, supra note 32.
27
28
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2009 that Portland, Oregon directed a lump-sum subsidy in the
amount of $3.5 million to Delta Air Lines to maintain direct
links between the city and Tokyo, which were reported to be
worth $61.2 million to the immediate region. 4 In Australia, the
Victorian government reportedly provided an undisclosed incentive to Tiger Airways Australia (effectively controlled in Singapore 5 ) to provide domestic services from Avalon Airport in
Melbourne."
In Europe, there has been concern raised over the subsidization of carriers by airports seeking to attract continued or new
services.37 A report from April 2010 revealed the concerns held
by distributor and charter airline operator Thomas Cook over
discounted aeronautical fees-read by some critics as a subsidy-for the launch of summer 2010 Ryanair services to the Canary Islands from the United Kingdom."' Thomas Cook argued
that the discounted fees would result in reduced services offered
to its own charter operations.3 9 This example illustrates how
balancing competition against minimum-required access for social-welfare maximization can be a delicate endeavor. European
Commission guidelines state that aid for new services should be
allowed for a maximum of five years in the case of remote
regions. 4°
B.

DIRECT SUBSIDIZATION OF FOREIGN AiRLINES

A cost-sharing agreement that captures subsidization can involve the state providing a direct underwrite of services provided
by a foreign airline, thus constituting an irregular direct economic subsidy.41 The conditions necessary for such an underwrite to be applicable exist: (a) when demand for travel along
specific origin-destination pairings is not robust enough to war34
35

Millman & Esterl, supra note 32.
BuREAu OF ECON., ENERGY, & Bus.

AFFAIRS,

supra note 32. Australia's domes-

tic market is fully deregulated with respect to ownership and effective control,
thus foreign nationals are permitted to own 100% of a domestic carrier, although
this is subject to approval from the country's Foreign Investment Review Board.

36 Heasley, supra note 32.
37 Thomas Cook Warns Canaries,supra note 32.
38 Id.
59 Id.

40 2005 0J. (C 312) 1, 13; Commission Decision 2004/393, 0J. (L 137).

These guidelines arise from a highly publicized case involving Ryanair, Walloon
Region, and Brussels South Charleroi Airport.
41 James Rude, Direct and Indirect Export Subsidies, in HANDBOOK ON INTERNA-

TIONAL TRADE POLICy 282-83 (William A. Kerr & James D. Gaisford eds., 2007).
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rant entry by a private provider, at least on a continual and profitable basis; and (b) where states may not have sufficient capital
to provide even state-owned air services. While the application
of utility functions at the level of the state may not be generally
feasible,4 2 it can be suggested that in instances where direct subsidization of air services as a rational policy instrument is introduced, utility is nonetheless maximized for the sake of national
interest.
Consideration should be given to whether subsidies may be
considered protectionist. Subsidization of air services may be
contentious, given that some markets are effective oligopolies.
In thin-market situations, provision of air services is left to one
operator operating ostensibly as a monopolist. Barriers to entry
may not be entirely insurmountable but are certainly present.
Expressed another way, subsidization of air services would be
more prevalent in monopoly situations because it is only
through direct subsidization of operating costs that profitability
is achieved by the monopolist when the absence of subsidization
results in marginal costs exceeding marginal revenue. If air-service provision generates positive externalities in the form of increased profits for local businesses, subsidizing an otherwise
unprofitable route may improve social welfare.
An exact determination of the optimal subsidy-which depends on the precise nature of demand, production costs, external benefits, and the relative negotiating positions of the state
and the monopolist-would require detailed econometric analyses.4 3 Necessary data (e.g., airline unit cost and revenue, seat
factors) for these types of analyses, however, are often unavailable for commercial reasons. In the absence of this data, we offer
guidance on suitable proxies for approaching policy decisions
regarding subsidization of an air-service provider.
It is reasonable to assume that thin markets give rise to monopoly market structures given the lack of interest by commercial providers in offering services. Where origin-destination
pairings also involve long-distance thin routes, the destination
state may have a limited choice of airlines to whom a subsidy
could be offered and who are still willing to offer services. The
kind of subsidy offered can thus play an important role, and it is
possible to develop a hypothetical example of the conditions in42 ZEEV

MAoz,

NATIONAL

CHOICES

AND

INTERNATIONAL

(Cambridge Univ. Press 1990).
43 Nolan, Ritchie & Rowcroft, supra note 3, at 371.

PROCESSES

214-15
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volved that illustrates the potential difficulty a state faces in establishing an optimum rate of subsidy. In such an example, the
profit function for a monopolist as a function of quantity, ru(q),
can be written as rr(q) = TR(q) - TC(q), where TR(q) and TC(q)
denote total revenue and total costs, respectively. Choosing q to
maximize profit yields the first order condition MR(q) = MC(q),
where MR(q) and MC(q) denote marginal revenue and marginal
cost, respectively. The necessary second order condition for
profit maximization is that profit at the optimal choices is nonnegative, or equivalently, the selling price must be greater than
or equal to average production costs, where production costs
include opportunity costs.

(a)no subsidy

(b) lump-sum
subsidy

. o.
. ...................
....

'10 Q,

MR

(c) per-unit
subsdy

.¢

o Dwtt

(d)per-un.t
subsidywithposive profits

FIGURE 1: SUBSIDIZATION OPTIONS UNDER
MONOPOLY CONDITIONS
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Monopoly behavior when average cost is greater than demand
is described in Figure la. For simplicity, we assume that the demand curve (D) is linear and marginal costs (ca) are constant,4 4
but our conclusions are robust to alternative demand and cost
specifications. Average production costs are represented by the
AC ° curve. The monopolist will not operate if the average production cost is greater than the price (Figure la). A subsidy is
therefore required to induce the monopolist to operate. The
subsidy may be a lump-sum payment or a per-unit rebate. A
lump-sum subsidy will not change marginal costs but will lower
average costs to AC 1 , as shown in Figure 1b, resulting in the monopolist producing qO at price pO. A per-unit subsidy, on the
other hand, lowers marginal costs in addition to reducing avere costs. This will induce the monopolist to increase output to
as in Figure I c.
It would be a coincidence if the per-unit subsidy that maximized state welfare resulted in zero profits when the monopolist
is free to choose price and quantity. If the marginal external
benefit of increasing the subsidy exceeds the marginal cost to
the state, the state will be better served by an output quantity
greater than q2. Such a situation is represented in Figure 1d,
where a larger per-unit subsidy results in production at q3.
There are also positive monopoly profits at q3. If there are subsidy-fueled profits, the state ma be able to persuade the monopolist to provide more than q3. The eventual outcome would
depend on the negotiating power of the monopoly operator
and state. While we noted earlier that state subsidy of carriers in
thin-market situations would generally feature the potential
presence of one carrier, the fact that the state is incentivized to
provide a subsidy to a single carrier for the purposes of maximizing social welfare could mean that other carriers may be willing
to participate on the route or in the sector. In this case, if there
are many airlines to which the state could potentially offer the
subsidy, the state could dictate that the monopolist provides q4.
On the other hand, if one airline can service the route at significantly lower costs than other airlines, the outcome will be close
to q3. In either case, if the state is able to command the quantity
produced, it is irrelevant whether a lump-sum or a per-unit subsidy is offered as the quantity provided is no longer determined

-4 Logically, the addition of new aircraft in air service provision would cause
marginal costs to increase sharply.
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by the monopolist equating marginal revenue and marginal-production costs.
IV.

PUBLIC SUBSIDIES: A PACIFIC ISLANDS EXAMPLE

As an example of cost sharing in the form of a public subsidy,
and the resultant policy considerations that this brings, this section critically examines a recent cost-sharing agreement, reported as a "isk-share," between Air New Zealand and the
government of the Cook Islands. For comparison, discussion
also centers on direct subsidization of air services as a policy instrument identified by the government of New Zealand with respect to other Pacific Island states. To begin, it is important to
situate the available connections from Rarotonga (RAR) to the
United States. Air Rarotonga services neighboring islands using
commuter aircraft (Saab 340, EMB1 10) but code shares with Air
Tahiti (VT) using a VT-registered ATR 72-500 for twice-weekly
RAR-Papeete services. 45 From Papeete, Air Tahiti Nui operates
daily A340-300 services to Los Angeles (LAX) .46 Air New Zealand operates weekly on the RAR-LAX route using a 767-300 in a
J24 Y210 configuration.
The Cook Islands News reported in September 2008 that the
existing year-old cost-sharing agreement between the Cook Islands government and Air New Zealand-valued at NZ$2.9 million-for the provision of non-stop LAX-RAR-LAX services was
being reconsidered and faced possible cancellation.4 7 A renewed agreement called for a NZ$5 million lump sum subsidy
from the Cook Islands government in order to ensure continuation of services. 8 The agreement was ratified in November 2008
with effect from April 2009. 40 From the perspective of the Cook
Islands, there is high value in non-stop LAX-RAR flights. 50 The
routing provides direct connectivity and reduces time factors in
access to visitors from North America. 51 European visitors also
45 Our Aircraft Fleet, AIR RARONTONGA, http://www.airraro.com/clientpages/
raro/fleet.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
46 AIR TAHITI Nui, http://www.airtahitinui-usa.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
47 Helen Greig, Weekly LA FRight Likely to Stop, COOK ISLANDS NEWS, Sept. 27,
2008, at 1.
48 Yvonne Tahara, Cooks Pays Air NA $5M to Keep Rarotonga Route, N.Z. HERALD,
Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=l&objectid
=10544850.
49 Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air N4 STUFF.CO.NZ, Nov. 28, 2010, http://www.
stuff.co.nz/business/738867; Tahara, supra note 48.
50 See generally Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
51 See id.
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utilize transfers at LAX to the direct service. 52 Visitation statistics demonstrate this raw importance with approximately 4,300
arrivals from the United States in 2007 (see Table 1) with an
average length-of-stay of ten days.
Year

New Zealand

United States

Australia

Total

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

30921
38755
49088
51841
58931

7630
6026
4434
5476
4343

11470
11850
11313
11470
12445

78328
83333
88405
92351
97077

TABLE 1. ARRIVALS BY COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE - COOK ISLANDS

In a recent article, Tim Hazledine and Stephanie Collins state
that air services to many Pacific Islands carry passengers for
whom any singular island nation is not the sole destination.
Such multi-destination travel is provided by attractive fare structures and marketing efforts in key markets. 54 Removal of the
LAX-RAR-LAX service would essentially remove Cook Islands'
actual and perceived accessibility and connectivity. Thus, for
those passengers who travel on Star Alliance Circle Pacific
(branded multi-stop itineraries) or round-the-world routings,
the existence of the service means that a stop in RAR is possible.
Visibility on the network is thus critical. For the purposes of this
article, the economic rationale for the risk-share agreement can
be explored further in order to understand the political environment that frames the agreement itself.
First, some assumptions must be made regarding the variable
cost structure-contributing to overall CASK (cost per available
seat kilometer)-of Air New Zealand operations on the route.
Specifically, it is feasible to assume that Air New Zealand could
well have faced LAX-RAR-LAX operations with average total
costs sitting above market demand for the service. 5 5 Around the
52

Id.

& N.Z. TOURISM RESEARCH INST., AUKLAND
UNIV. OF TECH., COOK ISLANDS TOURISM VISITOR SATISFACTION & IMPACT MONITOR
3 (2007); COOK ISLANDS STATISTICS OFFICE, Tourism Statistics: Visitor Arrivals by
53 COOK ISLAND TOURISM CORP.

Country of Usual Residence, http://www.stats.gov.ck/Statistics/Tourism/tourismctyofresid.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2011).
54 Tim Hazledine & Stephanie Collins, Paying the Pilot? The Economics of Subsidising InternationalAir Travel to Small Remote Island Nations with Large Diaspora,17
J. AIR TRANsP. MGMT. 187, 192 (2011).
55 See supra Figure la. As indicated previously, the lack of reliable data-for
commercial reasons-prevents meaningful analysis of the exact operational posi-

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

time it was reported that the existing year-old risk-share agreement was being reconsidered,56 it is reasonable to speculate that
Air New Zealand would have likely been facing increasing variable direct-operating costs (the price of jet fuel being a significant contributor, if not directly, then through hedging
contracts) such that demand on the route could not cover costs
in the short-run. Again, commercial confidentiality prevents an
empirical test of these assumptions; however, it is reasonable to
conclude that the unstable jet-fuel prices would have created an
uncertain operating environment in the short-term and, thus,
rendered a joint cost-sharing agreement an acceptable solution
toward mitigating uncertainty.
Second, while technically not offering monopoly RAR-LAX
services (in that other services are possible, save for potentially
significant sunk costs), Air New Zealand holds substantial market power that roughly resembles a monopoly. 57 While it cannot
properly be considered a dejure monopoly given that there is no
legal basis for attributing air services to one carrier servicing international routes to and from RAR (even with the cost-sharing
agreement in place, although this is admittedly purely speculative), the agreement essentially enhances state-sanctioned monopolist activities to the point where competitors may be
reluctant to initiate services.
Third, and from a government policy perspective, we can
identify several choices available to the government of the Cook
Islands: (1) accept the uncertainty of access and connectivity by
disengaging the existing cost-sharing agreement; (2) re-engage
with a previously established cost-sharing agreement, subject to
negotiation of amounts and conditions; and (3) seek other access options via other carriers.
Proceeding with a re-engagement of the cost-sharing agreement would allow for some degree of certainty in service provision to the Cook Islands from the United States. The
alternatives would have presented the Cook Islands with the
prospect of no guaranteed access to the lucrative U.S. market. 58
For example, there was a report in the Cook Islands News in late
September 2008 that Canadian carrier WestJet may have been
interested in a flight via Honolulu, although this was not at all
tion of Air New Zealand around the time the original "risk-share" agreement had
expired. See supra Part 11I.B.
56 Greig, supra note 47.
57 See Tahara, supra note 48.
58 See Greig, supra note 47.
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certain.59 The CEO of Cook Islands Tourism Corporation
(CITC) indicated that the LAX-RAR flight accounts for 19,000
international long haul visitors.60 Spend data available for Cook
Islands visitors is limited, although a study conducted by the
New Zealand Tourism Research Institute at Auckland University
of Technology, based on a survey of approximately 800 visitors,
revealed that the majority of international (non-New Zealand)
visitors stayed between one and fourteen days.61 North American and European visitors, with a small sample base in the research, are estimated to spend NZ$190 and NZ$201 per day,
respectively.6 2 Press surrounding the cost-sharing agreement in
November 2008 has the CITC quoting an average NZ$200 spent
per visitor per day, although it is not unreasonable to assume
that a substantial proportion of this figure includes accommodation and transportation.63 Comments attributed to the CEO of
the CITC in the press put the value of tourism to the Cook Islands at NZ$33 million, which includes the value of tourist expenditure plus revenue incurred through port departures and
arrivals.64
Several unknowns surround the Cook Islands-Air New Zealand agreement, many of which will likely remain as such owing
to commercial confidentiality. 65 Caution must be used when analyzing cost-sharing agreements from which primary data is not
easily available. First, it is not clear whether the subsidized
amount fluctuates with load factors, yield, or even standard revenue-passenger-kilometer measures. In other words, it is not
clear whether the subsidy covers the total cost of Air New Zealand's operations, whether there exists perhaps a minimum load
factor per sector or across a specific time frame, or whether
there is an explicit revenue guarantee where "top-ups" are provided to a particular threshold.66 Second, it is not clear whether
the agreement ties Air New Zealand operations to the use of a
specific gauge (in this case, a B767) and, by extension, whether
provision was made for a pro rata reduction in subsidy should
Air New Zealand choose to operate more fuel-efficient aircraft

63

Id.
Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
COOK ISLANDS STATISTICS OFFICE, supra note 53, at 3, 9-10.
Id. at 21.
Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.

64

Id.

65

See supra Part III.B.
Nolan, Ritchie & Rowcroft, supra note 3, at 365-66.

59
60
61

62

66
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on the route. Finally, it is not clear whether the subsidy is tied to
jet-fuel prices; if not, it can only be speculated whether Air New
Zealand priced the value of the service on the basis of the rather
substantial jet-fuel prices from 2008.67
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCESS POLICY

As discussed above, access and connectivity are closely aligned
with economic development. The 2007 IATA brief discussed
above noted that the economic value of connectivity from aviation helps drive productivity and overall economic development. 6 Exports, both hard goods and services such as tourism,
are clear beneficiaries of air access. Selim Ach and Brian Pearce
assessed the competitiveness of travel and tourism and found
that air transport infrastructure, including quantitative and
qualitative measurements, infrastructure quality, available-seat
kilometers, departures per 1,000 residents, airport density, the
number of operating airlines, and network quality were important predictor variables.69 This is amplified for remote destinations that rely almost entirely on air access for visitor arrivals.
Cost sharing thus becomes an attractive solution to problems of
access, particularly when routes and sectors are commercially
nonviable. Some primary policy responses available to destinations keen on retaining or attracting air services that may be
nonviable in an open market are summarized in Table 2.
Regardless of policy responses, there exist several implications, all of which are framed by the state's desire to retain or
enhance relative access and connectivity. The first implication
relates to the role of cost-sharing agreements in wider policies
on access in relation to economic development goals. As air access is often associated with tourism as an export-earning activity, cost shares can become an indirect subsidy of tourism, and
issues of opportunity cost and net social welfare arise as a result. 70 The specific terms and conditions of the cost share would

need to seriously consider several economic variables in an overall cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, the shape of the market (as67 See Jeff Bailey, Fuel Costs Just Part of Airlines' List of Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2008, at C1.
68 Smyth & Pearce, supra note 12.
69 Selim Ach & Brian Pearce, How Well Does the Travel & Tourism Competitiveness
Index Explain Differences in Travel Intensity Among Countries?, in THE TRAVEL &
TOURISM COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2009, at 55, 60 (Jennifer Blanke & Thea
Chiesa eds., 2009).
70 See, e.g., Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
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No subsidy

Advantages: Competition possible if favourable market conditions exist.
Disadvantages: Patchy, seasonal, and generally sporadic air services, possibly provided by foreign carriers; Limited network linkages and connectivity;
Potential for nonviable services in the long-term,
causing incumbent carrier(s) to exit market

Cost-share (underwrite)

Advantages: Assurance of access.
Disadvantages: Potential for some conditions to be
levied by airline that would require additional
resources (i.e., marketing); Market shape altered
(opportunity cost of lost competition).
Advantages: Assurance of access through joint marketing and promotional programmes, thus ensuring
consistency of messaging.
Disadvantages: Extensive consultation with wider
policy community, public governance structures,
and private stakeholders could create delays.

Joint venture

TABLE 2: POLICY LEVERS AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES

suming a market model) is potentially affected significantly if
access privilege is vested with a single carrier as a result of a cost71
share.
The second implication relates to sources of funding. Cost
shares need not be overt underwrites-however transparent-of
existing or new air services. 72 They can take other, more strategic forms. 73 Examples include joint advertising budgets and
campaigns and the inclusion of multiple stakeholders in a costshare agreement.74 For instance, a joint-destination advertising
campaign can include partners such as a local airport, the local
government, and the destination marketing organization, in addition to a specific airline.7 5 These reflect dynamic and flexible
partnership configurations and arrangements between multiple
stakeholders, including airports, destination marketing organizations, and airlines.
The third implication relates to post hoc policies governing revision and monitoring. Econometric analyses can assist in the
modeling of passenger movement relative to independent vari71 See id.
72 Nolan, Ritchie & Rowcroft, supra note 3, at 365-66; Millman & Esterl, supra
note 32, at A3.
73 Nolan, Ritchie & Rowcroft, supra note 3, at 365-66; Millman & Esterl, supra
note 32.
74 Nolan, Ritchie & Rowcroft, supra note 3, at 365-66; Millman & Esterl, supra
note 32; Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
75 See, e.g., Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
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ables that are seen to exert influence, 76 yet caution must be exercised in that there would not exist a meaningful control group
that would assist in measuring the impact of a cost-share arrangement. In remote destinations where air services are essential, this is somewhat easier to track given that the cessation of
air services can effectively mean a drastic drop in arrivals.77
VI.

THE FUTURE OF COST-SHARE ARRANGEMENTS

It is plausible that more air-service provisions could become
subsidized publicly in the near future in those states where spatial accessibility or connectivity is limited and, thus, of limited
attraction for private providers. There are several reasons for
this. First, it is commonly known that commercial airlines became increasingly risk averse during the 2008 and 2009 global
recession. 78 Decisions relating to markets served are thus influenced by access to limited capital and financing options as well
as rapidly shrinking demand due to depressed economies in key
markets that comprise otherwise profitable inbound and outbound traffic flows. Carriers also face uncertain unit costs in the
immediate future, whether through long-run marginal cost increases due to high costs of capital or fuel hedging losses.
Those states with limited accessibility and connectivity will be
most at risk as trading conditions continue to deteriorate. Although industry-wide conditions show some signs of improvement for 2010, 79 it is likely that some states will need to monitor

carefully the financial viability of their existing air-service provision, especially where provided by foreign carriers, and assess
whether such services are in jeopardy.
Second, and related, most geographically-separated countries
globally rely on services from providers that are not designated
as national carriers.8 ° Cases that are especially vulnerable are
those where carriers provide services within thin market origindestination pairs-when demand from an origin may be depressed due to economic reasons, supply at the destination is
limited due to size and developmental factors, or both. Indeed,
several islands in the Pacific Region fall under this category. As
76

See, e.g., id.; Subsidy Increase, Direct Flight to LA to Continue, CooK ISLANDS

TIMES WKLY., Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.ciherald.co.ck/articles/t278e.htm.
77 See Rarotonga Backs Subsidy to Air NZ, supra note 49.
78

See, e.g., Millman & Esterl, supra note 32.

79 Nicola Clark, Trade Group Sees Profit in '1O for Airlines as a Whole, N.Y. TIMES,

June 7, 2010, at B5.
80 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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discussed above, the cost-sharing agreement between Air New
Zealand and the Cook Islands government emulates in principle
access-assurance programs in other parts of the world.8 1
Owing to market uncertainties and challenges to cost and
yield by many airlines worldwide, it is reasonable to surmise that
the raw number of cost-share arrangements, in a variety of formats, could increase. Where they are inevitable due to apparent
commercial non-viability, consideration must be given to the
protectionist nature of the public subsidization of air-service
provision as national policy. While protectionist measures do
not necessarily align with liberal policies toward trade and investment including air transport, it can be argued that less-connected destinations-cities, regions, or entire states-may need
to utilize direct subsidization to protect air access and maximize
national welfare when existing market conditions do not warrant profitable unsubsidized services. In some cases, the level
and type of subsidy, whether per seat or lump sum, may well
depend on the structure of the market and, as noted, the bargaining power of both parties.
Finally, it is important to note that air-service provision may
also fall within wider development-aid programs as manifested
between developed and developing countries.8 2 In the case of
the Pacific Islands, the New Zealand Prime Minister indicated in
March 2009 that subsidization, through direct New Zealand government underwriting, of air services to nation states such as
Tonga and Samoa is generally consistent with foreign-aid
policy.83

VII.

CONCLUSION

Economic theory suggests that those states with smaller or
weaker factors of production are more likely to engage in policies that favor the subsidization of what would be seen as essential economic services. 84 Direct public subsidization would thus
be used to correct market failure and imbalances.85 This article
81 See supra Part IV.
82 E.g., New Zealand Government to Support Tonga and Samoa with Air NZ Services,
PAc. Bus. ONLINE, Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.pacificbusinessonline.com/newzealand/story/ 13293/new-zealand-government-support-tonga-and-samoa-air-nzservices.
83 Id.
84 Baldev Raj Nayar, Regimes, Power, and InternationalAviation, 49 IrNr'L ORG.
139, 144 (1995).
85 See supra Part III.B.
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has provided an overview of the economic efficiency, from a social-welfare perspective, of public and private risk-sharing agreements in air-service provision. It argued that term-limited ex ante
public and private cost-share agreements, not entirely dissimilar
to the Air New Zealand-Cook Islands example discussed above,
may represent a move toward more permanent subsidization by
states of air-service provision in uncertain economic environments and where private investment is either reduced or
unlikely.
From a policy response perspective, states may follow one or
more of the potential levers outlined herein, but on the assumption that adequate and reliable data are available, there is a
need to undertake a full cost-benefit analysis and wider
econometric studies in order to justify the policy before implementation. We have argued throughout that in periods of economic instability there is greater scope for states to seek means
of access assurance, of which cost sharing is but one example.
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